Duas vulnerabilidades críticas no Next.js, identificadas como CVE-2026-75604 e GHSA-2xp9-vwfh-vxw4, permitem execução remota de código não autenticada em aplicações hospedadas no Windows que utilizam a API de Otimização de Imagens para processar arquivos AVIF, de acordo com avisos da Vercel e do GitHub.
Duas vulnerabilidades críticas no Next.js, identificadas como CVE-2026-75604 e GHSA-2xp9-vwfh-vxw4, permitem execução remota de código não autenticada em aplicações hospedadas no Windows que utilizam a API de Otimização de Imagens para processar arquivos AVIF, de acordo com avisos da Vercel e do GitHub.
Em contexto
- Tema: Ciberseguridad — Riesgo, identidad, respuesta a incidentes y cumplimiento.
- Fonte: CISO Advisor
- Publicado: 26/08/2026
Continuar lendo na fonte original →
Trecho publicado automaticamente pelo radar do site. O texto completo pertence ao veículo e está vinculado acima.
Why it matters
Every time I read a case like this I think the same thing: security is not bought, it is operated. You can own every tool on the market and remain exposed if nobody reviews the alerts, if patches get applied when there is time, or if the backup was never tested by actually restoring it.
I separate technical risk from business risk, because they do not always match. A critical vulnerability in an isolated system matters less than a medium one in the system that issues invoices. Prioritising by severity without looking at where the money is is an expensive way to work hard and protect little.
What usually goes wrong
Where it usually breaks is response, not prevention. There are tools, there are alerts, and when something real happens nobody knows who decides to disconnect, who gets called first, or what the customer is told. Valuable hours get lost arguing about that while the problem grows.
What to watch
- Whether third parties or suppliers were in the chain, because the perimeter now includes partners.
- How long it took to detect, usually the most revealing metric in the whole case.
- Whether initial access came from a legitimate account handled badly, which is the most frequent pattern.
How I read this entry
What I would review this very week is access: accounts belonging to people who left, permissions that grew without anyone trimming them, and shared credentials everybody swears do not exist. It is the least glamorous work and the one that cuts off the most attacks.
The original story is published in another language; the excerpt is quoted as the publisher delivers it and the commentary is written in English.
Living through this in your own team?
Open the chat and tell me how you're handling it. I'm interested in comparing notes.
