Agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on Thursday arrested the co-founder of a Canadian cybersecurity firm in connection with an investigation into the ShinyHunters hacking group that recently relieved the FBI of sensitive data on thousands of agents, multiple sources tell KrebsOnSecurity.
Agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on Thursday arrested the co-founder of a Canadian cybersecurity firm in connection with an investigation into the ShinyHunters hacking group that recently relieved the FBI of sensitive data on thousands of agents, multiple sources tell KrebsOnSecurity.
In context
- Topic: Ciberseguridad — Riesgo, identidad, respuesta a incidentes y cumplimiento.
- Source: Krebs on Security
- Published: 09/10/2026
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Why it matters
Most incidents that end up being expensive did not start with a sophisticated technique. They started with an account that should have been closed when somebody resigned, a server nobody knew was still on, or a broad permission granted to unblock someone that then stayed forever.
I separate technical risk from business risk, because they do not always match. A critical vulnerability in an isolated system matters less than a medium one in the system that issues invoices. Prioritising by severity without looking at where the money is is an expensive way to work hard and protect little.
What usually goes wrong
What I see fail most is the backup. It is configured, it runs every night, nobody checks it. The day you need to restore, it turns out it had been failing silently for four months, or that everything was backed up except exactly what was needed. A backup never restored is an assumption.
What to watch
- What could be restored and how fast — a backup that was never tested does not count.
- How it was communicated to customers and regulators, which is where reputational cost is decided.
- Whether third parties or suppliers were in the chain, because the perimeter now includes partners.
How I read this entry
If this happened near an organisation I advise, the conversation I would force is not about tools. It is about the rehearsal. How many times the incident was simulated, who calls whom, what gets said to customers and when. A plan never rehearsed is not a plan, it is a document.
This entry is an excerpt from the original source, selected by the site radar. The commentary above is the site's own and does not belong to the cited publisher.
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Living through this in your own team?
Open the chat and tell me how you're handling it. I'm interested in comparing notes.
